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Abstract
Diagnosing multiple faults for a complex system is of-
ten very difﬁcult. It requires not only a model which
adequately represents the diagnostic aspect of a com-
plex system, but also an efﬁcient diagnostic algorithm
that can generate effective test and repair recommen-
dations. One way of developing such an efﬁcient and
effective diagnostic algorithm is to focus the compu-
tational resource on disambiguating a set of the most
likely potential faults, called focus faults. In this pa-
per, we apply decision theory to analyze strategies for
selecting focus faults. We propose a decision-theoretic
focusing strategy which is based on users’ risk toler-
ances. The proposed focusing strategy has been applied
to a large diagnostic model for locomotives, which has
been deployed intheﬁeld. Our diagnostic experts found
decision-theoretic focusing strategyuseful and informa-
tive.
Introduction
A model-based diagnosis system requires a diagnostic
model, which adequately represents the diagnostic aspect
of a system, and an inference algorithm, which can gener-
ate a ranked list of suspect faults, as well as test and repair
recommendations. Because of its succinct representation,
Bayesian networks (BN) have become a popular choice for
such diagnostic models (Darwiche 2000). Constructing ad-
equate diagnostic BN models for complex systems is often
laborious and time consuming. It is not until recently that
researchers proposed effective methodologies for construct-
ing diagnostic BNs with thousands of nodes. Since both ex-
act and approximate inferences for belief updating in BN
are NP-hard (Cooper 1990; Dagum & Luby 1993), it is ex-
pected that complex BN models will present computational
challenges to existing BN inference algorithms. Neverthe-
less, byexploitingvariousnetworkstructureandnodetypes,
inference algorithms can handle most complex BN models
efﬁciently.
When using Bayesian networks for multiple fault diagno-
sis, one usually generates test recommendations based on
some form of value of information computation (Hecker-
man, Breese, & Rommelse 1995). Computing either utility
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or quasi-utility based value of information (VOI) for multi-
ple fault diagnosis requires multiple belief updating, which
implies that VOI computation is even harder than belief
updating. In order to avoid the computational complexity
and to support a more focused diagnosis, some diagnostic
BN development environments, such as GeNIe (University
of Pittsburgh) and WIN-DX (Knowledge Industries, Inc.),
present to users a ranked list of faults, according to their
posterior marginal probabilities given the evidence, and al-
lowuserstoselectasubsetoffaultstopursueincomputation
of recommended tests using VOI. We refer to the subset of
pursued faults as focus faults and to the strategy used to de-
termine the selection as a focusing strategy. VOI computa-
tion will providea ranked list of tests based on their abilities
to disambiguate the focus faults. Although manual selection
of focus faults provides certain ﬂexibility, it relies on human
judgments regarding which faults are important. This leads
to two main disadvantages: (1)manualfault selections is not
feasible for autonomous diagnosis systems and (2) no deci-
sion support is provided to users to select the focus faults.
In this paper, we propose to apply decision theory to
support the selection of focus faults. During system trou-
bleshootingprocess the potential faults can be classiﬁed into
four categories: (1) committed faults, which users are com-
mitted to ﬁx, (2) focus faults, which users need to pursue,
(3) depleted faults, which are of interest but are not promi-
nent enough to be pursued, (4) discarded faults, which fall
beyond users’ interest. The decision of classifying a poten-
tial fault into one of these four categories can inﬂuence the
quality and time needed for troubleshooting. For the clas-
siﬁcation, we could use utilities as suggested by decision
theory; instead we are proposing to use zero-one loss func-
tion, which is less demanding in elicitation and computa-
tion. We develop a decision-theoretic focusing strategy to
assist users in classifying a fault and report the probability
oferrors foreach iteration offault selections. We implement
our focusing strategy in our inference engine and deploy it
with a diagnostic system for diesel locomotives, in which a
diagnostic Bayesian network consisting of 2,147 nodes and
3,650 arcs with custom layered structure and custom node
type is used to represent the problem (Lu & Przytula 2005).
Our diagnosticexpertsfoundnot only ourdecision-theoretic
focusingstrategyusefulbutalso thereportonthe probability
of errors informative.
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Fault diagnosis is basically a process of identifying causes
of system defects by observing the manifested effects. Dif-
ferent from single fault diagnosis, which assumes that only
onefaultis presentedina defectivesystem, multiplefaultdi-
agnosis admits the possibility that more than one fault could
occurwhena systemis defective. Manydifferentknowledge
representations have been used to support multiple fault di-
agnosis (de Kleer & Williams 1987; de Kleer 1991). In this
paper, we represent our diagnostic knowledge in Bayesian
networks; however, the focusing strategies presented in this
paper are not limited to a particular knowledge representa-
tion.
A Bayesian network (BN) describes a joint probability
distribution over a set of nodes (random variables) in a di-
rected acyclic graph. To represent diagnostic knowledge in
BN, we classify each node into one of following categories:
target, observation,and auxiliary. A target node usually rep-
resents a diagnostic interest (e.g., the health status of a fuel
injector). A target node has at least one target state, repre-
senting a failure mode (fault) of a component (e.g., a state
”plugged” as a failure mode of a fuel injector), and at least
onenon-targetstate, representinganormaloperationalmode
of a component (e.g., a state ”ok” for an operational fuel in-
jector). An observation node usually represents a symptom
(e.g., observing an excessive smoking in engine exhaust),
an built-in error message (e.g., the status of a power sup-
ply which is monitored by a feedback signal), or a test (e.g.,
measuring the voltage of a battery). An error message based
observation is normally recorded in an archive when it ob-
tains an abnormal state (e.g. power supply status is failed).
Whenanerrormessage,whichis continuouslymonitoredby
a signal, is not recordedin an archive,one couldassume that
the error message is in its default ok state. This is to account
forunreportedobservations(Peot& Shachter1998). A node
whichis neithera targetnoran observationis classiﬁed as an
auxiliarynode, which is usually used to represent intermedi-
ate relations between targets and observations. An observa-
tion node is further annotated with a Boolean ﬂag, ranked,
to specify whether a node will be ranked in the VOI compu-
tation. We normallyannotatea test, but notan errormessage
or a symptom, as ranked, since the states of symptoms and
error messages are usually available before a diagnostic ses-
sion is started and do not need to be recommended. We call
such an annotated Bayesian network a diagnostic Bayesian
network (dBN).
Troubleshooting Procedure
Figure 1 illustrates steps involved in a troubleshooting pro-
cedure, which include selection of faults to focus on and se-
lection of next test to perform:
1. Instantiate the initial set of observations, such as error
messages or reported symptoms;
2. Compute posterior probabilities of faults and generate a
ranked list of faults based on their posterior probabilities;
3. Check if available diagnostic information is sufﬁcient to
performrepairs;ifyes,stoptorepair;otherwise,continue;
Figure 1: A procedure for multiple faults diagnosis with a
diagnostic Bayesian network.
4. Select a set of focus faults; ’
5. Check if there are available focus faults, if yes, continue;
otherwise, stop.
6. Checkif there are still unperformedtests, if yes, continue;
otherwise, stop.
7. Compute the VOI for all unperformed tests relative to the
selected focus faults and generate a ranked list of tests
based on their VOI;
8. Perform one of the recommended tests and instantiate its
test result;
9. Go to Step 2.
Notice that observationinstantiations in Step 1 and 8 con-
stitute on input to our diagnostic system, which could be ei-
ther provided manually by users or automatically loaded by
otherprograms. Step 2 producesa rankedlist of faults based
on the posterior probabilitiesof faults computedby standard
belief updating in BN.
In the following section, we will ﬁrst outline the value of
information computation for multiple faults, which is used
in Step 7 to generate a ranked list of tests. We will then
present our focusing strategies on providing decision sup-
port for selecting the set of focus faults in Step 4.
Value of Information
The value of information is a measure for quantifying the
value of obtaining an item of information (e.g., result of a
843test) for our decision problem (e.g., differentiating a set of
faults) (Jensen 2001). It starts with deﬁning a value function
which maps the probability distribution of a hypothesis into
a real value: V (P(H|e)) : [0;1]|H| → R, where H is a
hypothesiswith|H| numberofmutuallyexclusivestates and
e is the set of evidences. The expected value for performing
a test T is
EV (T) =
X
t∈T
V (P(H|e,t))P(t), (1)
where t is a result of the test T. The expected beneﬁt for
performing a test T is
EB(T) = EV (T) − V (P(H|e)). (2)
Decision theory recommends using utility function as the
value function. In situations where utility function is hard to
elicit, one can use quasi-utility value functions (Glasziou &
Hilden 1989). In this paper, we will use entropy function as
our value function:1
V (P(H|e)) , H(H|e) = −
X
h∈H
P(h|e)log2 P(h|e),
(3)
where h is a state of the hypothesis H, and the expected
beneﬁt as
EB(T) = H(H|T,e) − H(H|e) = I(H;T|e), (4)
where I(H;T|e) is the mutual information between H and
T. In order to rank different hypotheses using EB(T), we
will normalize the expected beneﬁt by H(H|e) and deﬁne
the value of information of performing a test T for a hy-
pothesis H given evidences e as
VOI(H,T|e) =
EB(T)
H(H|e)
− αC(T), (5)
where C(T) is the cost of performing the test T and α is a
scaling ratio2.
When performing the single fault diagnosis, we are in-
terested in differentiating a selected focus fault against the
rest. In other words, we deﬁne a hypothesis variable H as
H = {f,f}, where f is a target state (fault) of a target vari-
able and f is the negation of the fault f, i.e., the rest of the
states of the target variable.
Recall that a dBN may consist of many target nodes and
each target node may have more than one target states. Con-
sider for example a dBN which includes, in addition to
other node types, two target nodes F1 and F2 with states
{f11,f12,ok} and {f21,ok} respectively. This dBN al-
lows us to investigate three single fault hypotheses H1 =
{f11,f11},H2 = {f12,f12}, and H3 = {f21,f21}. If
we decide to pursue the fault f11, i.e., selecting the f11 as
the focus fault from the ranked list of faults, we will com-
pute VOI(H1,T|e) for each unperformed test T to generate
a ranked list of tests, i.e., ranking the values of VOI of all
unperformed tests.
1Readers are recommended to read (Glasziou & Hilden 1989)
for the appropriate use of different quasi-utility functions.
2Please note that we use the linear transformation as an exam-
ple, however, one can have more elaborated transformation func-
tion.
Table 1: Conﬁgurations of (F1,F2).
c1 = (f11,f21) c2 = (f12,f21) c3 = (ok,f21)
c4 = (f11,ok) c5 = (f12,ok) c6 = (ok,ok)
When performingthe multiple fault diagnosis, we ﬁrst se-
lect a set of focus faults that we wish to pursue. There are
many ways to construct a hypothesis variable H for the se-
lected focus faults F (Jagt 2002). We consider three com-
monwaysofconstructingahypothesisvariable: conjunction
(∧), disjunction (∨), and unique existence (⊕). Continuing
on our example, there are six conﬁgurations (ci) for our two
targetvariables(Table1). Assume that we select f11 andf21
as our focus faults F. If we are interested in differentiating
f11 ∧f21 from the rest, we will repartition the conﬁguration
of (F1,F2) to derive the hypothesis variable H = {h1,h2},
where h1 = c1 and h2 = {c2,...,c6}. If we are inter-
ested in differentiating f11 ∨ f21 from the rest, we will
have H = {h1,...,h5}, where hi = ci for i = 1,...,4,
and h5 = {c5,c6}. If we are interested in differentiating
f11 ⊕ f21 from the rest, we will have H = {h1,h2,h3}
where h1 = c3,h2 = c4, and h3 = {c1,c2,c5,c6}.
In this paper, we will use the disjunction (∨) to com-
pose hypothesis states, i.e., each conﬁguration which is sat-
isﬁed with the disjunction of the selected focus faults will
become a state of H and those unsatisﬁed conﬁgurations
will be grouped into one state of H. We will then com-
pute VOI(H,T|e) for each unperformedtest T to generate a
rankedlist oftests. Inotherwords, we arerankingthe values
of VOI for all available tests on differentiating the states of
H derived from the disjunction of focus faults.
Unlike computing VOI for single fault diagnosis, where
all required probabilities of H are available from standard
belief updating in BN, computing VOI for multiple fault di-
agnosis require us to derive the probabilities of H from the
joint probabilities of the selected focus variables, which are
not directly available in standard belief updating in BN. Al-
though there are methods for computing P(H|e), where H
is technically a set of target variables F in dBN (Xu 1995;
Smith 2001), it soon becomes intractable since the number
of conﬁgurations of F grows exponentially. Instead, we
will approximate P(H|e) by the marginal probabilities of
F. In other words, we assume that target variables in F
are independent. Continuing on our example, we will have
P(F|e) = P(F1|e)P(F2|e) to derive P(H|e).
Focusing Strategies
A focusing strategy is used to decide which fault will be in-
cluded in the set of focus faults. The set of focus faults is
then used to form the states of the hypothesis variable for
VOI computation. Since the number of the states of the
hypothesis variable grows exponentially in the number of
selected focus faults, it is impractical to include all faults
as focus faults when diagnosing a complex system. On the
other hand, applyingan ad-hoc strategy, such as using a pre-
determined small number of focus faults, is hard to general-
ize to different kinds of system failures.
For example, in model-based diagnostic systems
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also called a candidate, is a conjunction of faults. They
focus the diagnostic reasoning on the subset of diagnoses
(called leading diagnoses) that satisfy the following
conditions:
• There are no more than k1 (usually k1 = 5) leading diag-
noses.
• Candidates with probability less than 1
k2th usually k2 =
100) of the best diagnosis are not considered.
• The diagnoses need not include more than k3 (usually
k3 = .75) of the total probability mass of the candidates.
We could adapt deKleer’s selection of leading diagnoses as
focus fault selections. However, we are still lacking a way
to analyze the consequence of their focusing strategy.
To evaluate focusing strategies, we apply decision theory.
We ﬁrst assume that each decision of selecting a fault as
focus can be made independently3. Let λi(fij|fik) be the
loss function associated with selecting a target (fault) state
fij of a target node Fi as a focus fault, when actually a state
fik of Fi should be selected4. The expected loss (risk) of
selecting the fault fij as focus is deﬁned as follows:
Ri(fij|e) =
X
ik
λi(fij|fik)P(fik|e). (6)
The optimaldecisionf∗
ij is derivedfromminimizingthe risk
Ri(fij|e):
f∗
ij = argmin
ij
X
ik
λi(fij|fik)P(fik|e). (7)
Assume the linear additivity among the risks, the total risk
of selecting a set of focus faults Fl is deﬁned as follows:
R(Fl) =
X
i∈l
ωiRi(fij|e), (8)
where ωi is the weighting factor for Ri. We can compute
R(Fl) for any non-emptyset of focus faults Fl derived from
different focusing strategies. However, the optimal strategy
is the one minimizing R(Fl):
F∗
l = argmin
l
X
i∈l
ωiRi(fij|e). (9)
When loss functionsλi(fij|fik) and weight factorsωi are
hard to obtain, we may assume the zero-one loss function
(λi(fij|fik) = 1, if fij  = fik; λi(fij|fik) = 0, otherwise)
and the equal weighting factor (ωi = 1) for all i. Conse-
quently, the risk for deciding on fij reduces to the probabil-
ity of error, i.e., Ri(fij|e) = 1 − P(fij|e).
To minimize the risk, we will choose f∗
ij with the maxi-
mum P(fij|e) among all j. In other words, the probability
of correctness is P(f∗
ij|e). Since all faults in Fl are assumed
to be jointly independent, we will have the total probabil-
ity of correctness as
Q
i P(f∗
ij|e) and the total probabilityof
3If this assumption is not valid, we need to consider the utility
(loss) function over the dependent faults.
4fik could be an ok state.
error as 1 −
Q
i P(f∗
ij|e). These assumptions will lead us
to the optimal F∗
l , which contains only one fault with the
maximum P(f∗
ij|e). In general, we have derived a decision-
theoretic framework to evaluate the total risk for any Fl as
in Equation 8.
In practice of multiple fault diagnosis, it is convenient
to classify faults into four categories: (1) committed faults,
which users are committed to ﬁx, (2) focus faults, which
users need to pursue, (3) depleted faults, which are of in-
terest but are not prominent enough to be pursued, (4) dis-
carded faults, which fall beyond users’ interest. One way of
classifyinga fault intooneof these categoriesis to deﬁne the
probabilitythresholds: committedfault threshold(pc), focus
fault threshold (pf), and discarded fault threshold (pd), such
that a fault fij is considered committed (pc ≤ P(fij|e) ≤
1), focus (pf ≤ P(fij|e) < pc), depleted (pd ≤ P(fij|e) <
pf), or discarded (0 ≤ P(fij|e) < pd)5. Ideally, we can
deﬁne separately the set of probability thresholds for each
fault, because we may see the risk for each fault differently;
for example, the committed fault threshold, pc, for a mis-
sion critical fault will be smaller than the one for a fault of
an auxiliary component. However, when such information
is hard to obtain, we can deﬁne one set of thresholds for all
faults. Once we have classiﬁed all the faults into their cate-
gories, we can compute the total risks for each category of
faults so that users are informed about the consequences of
their decisions.
Instead of specifying probability thresholds, users can
specify the model-wide total risk thresholds for committed
(trc), focus (trf), and depleted (trdp) faults. Given a list of
faults F ranked by their P(fij|e) in descending order, we
can classify each fault fij into its category according to the
procedure ClassifyFaults(F,trc,trf,trdp) outlined in Fig-
ure 2, where we assume zero-one loss functions and equal
weightingfactors. The proceduretakes a rankedlist offaults
F with their P(fij|e) as inputs and outputs a partition of
F into: committed faults (Fc), focus faults (Ff ), depleted
faults(Fdp),anddiscardedfaults(Fdi). Theprocedureloops
throughthe list of faults in F (Line 5-18). For each fault, the
procedurestarts with computingthe accumulatedrisk (prob-
ability of errors) of including the fault (Line 6-7). If the ac-
cumulated risk is smaller than the total risk threshold for the
current fault category, the fault is added into the category
(Line 9). Otherwise, the procedure checks if it has reached
the last category (Line 14) , if yes, all the remaining faults
will be added into discarded faults (Line 19-21); if not, the
procedure advances to the next fault category (Line 11).
Evaluation
To test the performance of different focusing strategies, we
conducted experiments on two proprietary networks, tcc4g
and emdec6h, constructed by HRL for diagnosing two sub-
systemsoflocomotives. Intcc4gnetwork,thereare36target
5These thresholds are in fact the probabilities of correctness of
classifyingfij intoone ofthecategories, ifweusethezero-one loss
function and the equal weighting factor. In other words, one can
use risk thresholds instead of probability thresholds, if information
is available.
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Input: A list of faults F ranked by their P(fij|e) in
descending order, a total rsik threshold for committed
faults trc, a total risk threshold for focus faults trf, and
a total risk threshold for depleted faults trdp,
Output: Fc: the set of committed faults; Ff: the set of
focus faults; Fdp: the set of depleted faults, and Fdi:
the set of discarded faults.
1. k := 0; // index of TR and SF
2. tpc := 1.0; // total probability of correctness
3. TR := [trc,trf,trdp];
4. SF := [Fc,Ff,Fdp];
5. for (ij := 0; ij < |F|; ij++)
6. tpc := tpc ∗ P(fij|e);
7. tpe := 1.0 − tpc; // total probability of error
8. if (tpe < TR[k])
9. SF[k] := SF[k] ∪ fij;
10. else
11. k++; // move to the next fault category
12. tr := 1.0; // reset total risk
13. ij −−; // retreat fault index
14. if k > 2
15. break; // break for loop
16. end if
17. end if
18. end for
19. for (;ij < |F|; ij++)
20. Fdi := Fdi ∪ fij;
21. end for
Figure 2: A procedure for classifying a list of faults into
their fault categories.
nodes and 69 observations (29 error messages and 40 tests).
In emdec6h network, there are 47 target nodes and 117 ob-
servations (53 error messages and 54 observations). We de-
cided not to run our performance evaluation on any of the
publicly available BN, since we have no domain knowledge
of annotating those networks into dBN.
For each network, we randomly generate n diagnostic
cases andrunthreefocusingstrategies(deKleer,probability-
threshold, risk-threshold) on them. In each case, we ﬁrst
generate the “real” target states by randomly selecting 10
percent of target nodes to fail, and each of which is ran-
domly assigned with one of its target states. The rest of
target nodes are randomly assigned with one of their non-
target states.6 We then plug in these “real” target states into
the network and update the belief for observations. We gen-
erate the “real” states of observations by casting the states
6This assignment scheme does not lead to inconsistent target
states because target nodes in both tcc4g and emdec6h are jointly
independent. When target nodes are dependent in a dBN, we may
use the forward sampling to generate consistent states.
of the modes of their posterior distributions. These “real”
states of observations will be used in diagnosis as simulated
test results or the initial states of error messages.
Once we generate the “real” states for all the cases, we
start the diagnosis procedure as outlined in Figure 1 to gen-
erate “diagnosed”states. For each case, we instantiate all er-
rormessages into their “real” states in dBN as in Step 1. The
diagnostic procedure will perform each step iteratively until
there is no test to perform (Step 6), no focus faults available
(Step 5), or ready to repair (Step 3). We assume that we are
ready to repair, when we perform tests up to three times the
number of failed targets. Once the diagnostic procedure is
stopped, we record the “diagnosed” state of a target node by
casting the mode of its posterior distribution.
Foreachcase, we computethescoresofsensitivity (Sen.),
speciﬁcity (Spe.), and accuracy (Acc.) to account for the
qualityofdiagnosis. Recall thateachtargetnodehasa“real”
state and “diagnosed” state in our simulation. If the “real”
state is a target (non-target) state and its diagnosed state is
the same target (non-target) state, we count it as one of the
correctly diagnosed defects (non-defects). The sensitivity
(speciﬁcity) is the ratio of correctly diagnosed defects (non-
defects). The accuracy is the ratio of overall correct diagno-
sis. For each combination of simulation parameters, we fur-
ther compute the mean and standard deviation of sensitivity,
speciﬁcity, and accuracy scores for each focusing strategy.
To ensure that the number of randomly generated diag-
nostic cases does not bias our evaluation results, our ex-
ploratory experiments indicate that 5000 cases seem to be
sufﬁcient for both tcc4g and emdech6h. Hence we will only
report our experiment results of 5000 cases with some ﬁxed
parameters for each focusing strategy. For de Kleer’s fo-
cusing strategy, we ﬁx k1 = 5 and k3 = .75 as suggested in
deKleer&Willams(1989)andvarythek2 = 1000,100,10.
For probability-threshold strategy, we ﬁx pc = 0.9 and
pd = 0.00001 and vary the pf = 0.001,0.01,0.1 with re-
spect to the variation of k2. For risk-threshold strategy, we
ﬁx trc = 0.271 and trdp = 0.9999 corresponding to the se-
lected pc and pd, and vary the trf = 1,0.9999,0.999 with
respect to the variation of pf. We further introduced the k1
parameter into both decision-theoretic focusing strategies,
i.e., both strategies will not pursuemore than k1 = 5 targets,
to reduce the built-in bias in de Kleer’s focusing strategy.
The results of evaluation for tcc4g and emdec6h are shown
in Table 2 and 3. We did see both probability-threshold
and risk-threshold strategies perform slightly better than de
Kleer’s strategy.
Conclusion
The major contributions of our paper are: (1) introduction
of the concept of fault categories, (2) application of deci-
sion theory to analyze the problem of focus fault selections,
(3) development of an informative decision-theoretic focus-
ing strategy, (4) reporting experiment results of evaluating
different focusing strategies, and (5) deploying the imple-
mentation of our focusing strategies into the ﬁeld.
Although focusing is not novel in diagnosis, applying
decision theory to analyze the consequence of focusing is
846Table 2: Evaluation Results for TCC4G: Average Sensitivity, Speciﬁcity, and Accuracy - 5000 cases.
de Kleer’s Probability-Threshold Risk-Threshold
k2 Sen. Spe. Acc. pf Sen. Spe. Acc. trf Sen. Spe. Acc.
0.001 0.6654 0.9940 0.9666 0.001 0.6733 0.9940 0.9673 1 0.6670 0.9939 0.9667
0.01 0.6313 0.9941 0.9639 0.01 0.6378 0.9941 0.9644 0.9999 0.6439 0.9937 0.9646
0.1 0.5880 0.9927 0.9590 0.1 0.5709 0.9929 0.9577 0.999 0.6255 0.9936 0.9630
Table 3: Evaluation Results for EMDEC6H: Average Sensitivity, Speciﬁcity, and Accuracy - 5000 cases.
de Kleer’s Probability-Threshold Risk-Threshold
k2 Sen. Spe. Acc. pf Sen. Spe. Acc. trf Sen. Spe. Acc.
0.001 0.6579 0.9985 0.9695 0.001 0.6742 0.9982 0.9707 1 0.6752 0.9981 0.9706
0.01 0.6469 0.9985 0.9686 0.01 0.6800 0.9983 0.9712 0.9999 0.6842 0.9980 0.9713
0.1 0.6342 0.9984 0.9674 0.1 0.5711 0.9979 0.9616 0.999 0.6834 0.9980 0.9712
novel. Such analysis leads us to the development of infor-
mativefocusingstrategies. Furthermore,the conceptoffault
categories(especiallythe categoryof committedfault)is not
found in the literature to the best of our knowledge. This
makesourfocusingstrategiespotentiallyperformbetterthan
the strategy adapted from de Kleer’s (1989), because their
strategy might wrongly focus on differentiating committed
faults.
When applying focusing strategies to a particular prob-
lem, we recommend users to validate assumptions in our
decision-theoretic focusing strategies. For example, one
may want to use different loos function for each individual
fault, if dBN include dependentfaults or zero-one loss func-
tion is not appropriate. One may want to use different total
risk function, if linear additivity is not valid. Furthermore,
one may consider using different hypothesis formation op-
erator in VOI computation. We also recommend users to
ﬁne-tune the parameters of selected focusing strategy with
respect to the problem.
In the future, we would like to extend our evaluation
methods to attribute the diagnosibility to its sources. In ad-
dition to focusing strategies, there could be many other fac-
tors affecting our diagnostic scores. For example, it could
be the case that we have a perfect model describing the sys-
tem, but the system does not provide enough observability
to separate the faults. It could also be the case that we did
not model the system correctly into dBN. We are currently
investigating different evaluation methods.
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